How to read a DMARC aggregate report

What the XML files receivers send you actually contain, how to tell legitimate senders from spoofing and forwarding, and what to do with each line.

Updated

Want to see where your domain stands before you start? Check your DMARC record

Once your DMARC record has a rua= address, every major receiver (Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Apple, Comcast, Mail.ru…) sends you a daily aggregate report: an XML file that lists every IP address that sent mail claiming to be from your domain, how many messages, and whether SPF and DKIM passed. The reports look intimidating; they are not. This guide shows what to read and what to ignore.

What arrives in the mailbox

Unzip it and open the XML in any text editor or browser. For a handful of reports a day, reading by hand is fine. Beyond that, a free parser or a spreadsheet import saves time; the structure below is what every tool displays.

The structure of a report

A report has three top-level parts:

<feedback>
  <report_metadata>   who sent the report and for which 24-hour window
  <policy_published>  the DMARC record the receiver saw
  <record>            one block per sending IP address (repeated)
</feedback>

Everything you need is inside the <record> blocks:

<record>
  <row>
    <source_ip>209.85.220.41</source_ip>
    <count>240</count>
    <policy_evaluated>
      <disposition>none</disposition>
      <dkim>pass</dkim>
      <spf>pass</spf>
    </policy_evaluated>
  </row>
  <identifiers>
    <header_from>yourdomain.com</header_from>
  </identifiers>
  <auth_results>
    <dkim><domain>yourdomain.com</domain><selector>google</selector><result>pass</result></dkim>
    <spf><domain>yourdomain.com</domain><result>pass</result></spf>
  </auth_results>
</record>

Read it in this order:

  1. source_ip and count: who sent, and how much. Look the IP up (a reverse DNS lookup or a WHOIS is enough) to recognise your provider, your marketing tool, your ticketing system.
  2. policy_evaluated: the result after alignment. This is the only pass/fail that DMARC cares about. A row counts as DMARC pass when dkim or spf is pass here.
  3. disposition: what the receiver did: none, quarantine or reject. With p=none it is always none.
  4. auth_results: the raw results, with the domain that was actually authenticated. This is how you diagnose why something failed.

Alignment, in one sentence

SPF and DKIM can pass for some domain; DMARC only accepts them if that domain is your From domain (or a subdomain of it, in relaxed mode). When auth_results says dkim … result pass for mailplatform.com but policy_evaluated says dkim fail, the signature was valid but not aligned: the service signed with its own domain instead of yours.

Three rows you will meet

Row What you see What it means What to do
Your mail provider Google or Microsoft IP ranges, high count, dkim pass, spf pass Everything works Nothing
A marketing or ticketing tool Known vendor IP, policy_evaluated both fail, auth_results shows dkim pass for the vendor’s domain Legitimate but not aligned Enable “custom domain” DKIM at the vendor (they will give you a CNAME) and add their SPF include if they use your domain in the envelope
An unknown IP, often abroad Small or large counts, dkim fail, spf fail, header_from is your domain Spoofing, or forwarding If the count is steady and you do not recognise it, it is spoofing: your policy will handle it once you enforce p=quarantine/reject. If it coincides with mail your users forward (university alumni addresses, personal mailboxes), it is forwarding

Forwarding breaks SPF (the forwarding server is not in your record) but keeps DKIM when the content is untouched. Mailing lists that add a footer or a subject tag break DKIM too; receivers increasingly use ARC to rescue those, and the volume is usually tiny. Accept it rather than weaken your policy.

A weekly routine

  1. Collect a week of reports in one place (a shared mailbox, a folder, or a parser).
  2. For each source_ip, note the organisation and the share of messages that pass alignment.
  3. Fix the legitimate sources that fail, one at a time: enable DKIM with your domain first, then SPF.
  4. When every legitimate source passes for two consecutive weeks, tighten the policy: see From p=none to p=reject.

Check the record itself with the DMARC checker after every change. It also verifies that an external reporting address (a report service on another domain) has published the authorisation record receivers look for.

What the reports do not contain

Check your work. Run the checker on your domain: it reads the live DNS records and tells you what is still missing.